[#41431] [ruby-trunk - Bug #5694][Open] Proc#arity doesn't take optional arguments into account. — Marc-Andre Lafortune <ruby-core@...>
Maybe we can add a new arity_range method that does this?
On Thu, Dec 1, 2011 at 6:54 PM, Yehuda Katz <wycats@gmail.com> wrote:
You could probably extract the information from #parameters, yeah.
On Thu, Dec 1, 2011 at 11:13 PM, Yehuda Katz <wycats@gmail.com> wrote:
Yeahit would be nice to be able to do:
[#41435] [ruby-trunk - Feature #5695][Open] CoffeeScript "is" and "isnt" keywords — Suraj Kurapati <sunaku@...>
[#41456] [ruby-trunk - Bug #5700][Open] fork {} segfaults during VM cleanup when run inside Fiber — Eric Wong <normalperson@...>
[#41478] [ruby-trunk - Feature #5707][Open] temporary file creation without finalizer and delegate. — Akira Tanaka <akr@...>
Akira Tanaka <akr@fsij.org> wrote:
2011/12/5 Eric Wong <normalperson@yhbt.net>:
[#41496] [ruby-trunk - Bug #5714][Open] Unexpected error of STDIN#read with non-ascii input on Windows XP — Heesob Park <phasis@...>
Hello,
Hello,
Hello,
[#41511] [ruby-trunk - Bug #5719][Open] Hash::[] can't handle 100000+ args — Nick Quaranto <nick@...>
[#41541] [ruby-trunk - Feature #5726][Open] Process::EXIT_SUCCESS and Process::EXIT_FAILURE — Akira Tanaka <akr@...>
[#41557] [ruby-trunk - Bug #5730][Open] Optinal block parameters assigns wrong — Yukihiro Matsumoto <matz@...>
2011/12/9 Yukihiro Matsumoto <matz@ruby-lang.org>:
Hi,
Hi Matz,
[#41581] [ruby-trunk - Bug #5737][Open] WEBrick doesn't support keep alive connections for 204 and 304 responses — Aaron Patterson <aaron@...>
[#41586] [ruby-trunk - Feature #5741][Open] Secure Erasure of Passwords — Martin Bosslet <Martin.Bosslet@...>
[#41592] My bug evaluation criteria — Marc-Andre Lafortune <ruby-core-mailing-list@...>
I don't think there is an official way to judge a bug, but for me it
[#41594] [ruby-trunk - Bug #5746][Open] Proc#curry too strict about lambda's arity. — Marc-Andre Lafortune <ruby-core@...>
[#41618] [ruby-trunk - Bug #5754][Open] Double require bug in 1.9.3 — Evan Phoenix <evan@...>
[#41630] redmine.ruby-lang.org -> bugs.ruby-lang.org — Shugo Maeda <shugo@...>
Hello,
[#41634] [ruby-trunk - Bug #5759][Open] flatten calls to_ary on everything — Thomas Sawyer <transfire@...>
[#41656] [ruby-trunk - Bug #5763][Open] sprintf not throwing error for wrong number of arguments — NagaChaitanya Vellanki <me@...>
[#41662] [ruby-trunk - Bug #5765][Open] [PATCH] modernize Timeout usage in net/{http,pop,smtp,telnet} — Eric Wong <normalperson@...>
[#41668] [ruby-trunk - Feature #5766][Open] Hash.each_with_object should behave differently when block's arity is 3 — Rodrigo Rosenfeld Rosas <rr.rosas@...>
[#41672] [ruby-trunk - Feature #5767][Open] Cache expanded_load_path to reduce startup time — Yura Sokolov <funny.falcon@...>
[#41681] Documentation of the language itself (syntax, meanings, etc) — Rodrigo Rosenfeld Rosas <rr.rosas@...>
Since Ruby is built on top of simple concepts, most of the documentation
Em 15-12-2011 19:23, Gary Wright escreveu:
On Dec 15, 2011, at 7:39 PM, Rodrigo Rosenfeld Rosas wrote:
Em 19-12-2011 19:38, Eric Hodel escreveu:
On Dec 19, 2011, at 3:04 PM, Rodrigo Rosenfeld Rosas wrote:
Em 19-12-2011 23:35, Eric Hodel escreveu:
[#41691] Ruby IRC Presence Problem — Eero Saynatkari <ruby-ml@...>
Hi,
[#41717] Feature : optional argument in File.join — Michel Demazure <michel@...>
In Windows, when using File.join, one often ends with a path containing
On Mon, Dec 19, 2011 at 6:09 AM, Michel Demazure <michel@demazure.com> wrote:
Luis Lavena wrote in post #1037331:
Hi,
On Tue, Dec 20, 2011 at 02:12, Nobuyoshi Nakada <nobu@ruby-lang.org> wrote:
Hi,
On Tue, Dec 20, 2011 at 08:17, Nobuyoshi Nakada <nobu@ruby-lang.org> wrote:
Nikolai Weibull wrote in post #1037488:
[#41721] Ruby and oniguruma relation. — V咜 Ondruch <v.ondruch@...>
Hi everybody,
[#41725] [ruby-trunk - Feature #5778][Open] Allow WEBrick::HTTPResponse to send IO-duck-typed bodies — Alex Young <alex@...>
[#41728] [ruby-trunk - Feature #5781][Open] Query attributes (attribute methods ending in `?` mark) — Thomas Sawyer <transfire@...>
[#41774] [ruby-trunk - Feature #5788][Open] Thread#at_exit — Masaki Matsushita <glass.saga@...>
[#41780] [Backport93 - Backport #5793][Open] Please backport r33662, r33666 — Jon Forums <redmine@...>
[#41787] Breaking while loading — Nikolai Weibull <now@...>
Hi!
[#41797] [ruby-trunk - Feature #5805][Open] object_hexid — Thomas Sawyer <transfire@...>
[#41799] Best way to separate implementation specific code? — Luis Lavena <luislavena@...>
Hello,
2011/12/24 Luis Lavena <luislavena@gmail.com>:
Hello,
On Sun, Dec 25, 2011 at 10:51 PM, U.Nakamura <usa@garbagecollect.jp> wrote:
Hello,
Hello,
Hi,
On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 11:21 PM, Yukihiro Matsumoto <matz@ruby-lang.org> wrote:
Hi,
On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 11:44 PM, Yukihiro Matsumoto <matz@ruby-lang.org> wrote:
[#41812] [ruby-trunk - Feature #5809][Open] Benchmark#bm: remove the label_width parameter — Benoit Daloze <redmine@...>
[#41841] YAML has become very slow under 1.9 — j.wuttke <j.wuttke@...>
The simple script
[#41848] [ruby-trunk - Feature #5826][Open] When the RUBY API_VERSION will be increased? — Ayumu AIZAWA <ayumu.aizawa@...>
[ruby-core:41736] [ruby-trunk - Feature #5741] Secure Erasure of Passwords
Issue #5741 has been updated by Martin Bosslet. Thanks for your thoughts! > I think you're going to adopt opt-in way, so library/application > developers must add String#clear call after using the password, right? Yes, I think opt-in is the only way to ensure there are no negative side effects on existing code. > If it's opt-in, new specific class would be enough I think. In this > way, we can control the memory copy (part-of, of course) and eventually > we might be able to split buffers into multiple parts that have > different addresses. > > class SecureByteBuffer > def ==(rhs) > raise unless rhs.is_a?(SecureByteBuffer) > ... > end > > def clear > ... > end > end That is an interesting approach, I'd love to catch up on this. So far, I had four ideas for implementing such a thing. 1. String#clear + it's at the "root" of the problem + adoption of the feature will merely ask for calling #clear on password variables at the right places - invasive because rarely needed - memory side effects of other string ops might be hard to keep in sync 2. Decorator/Visitor/Subclass of String + Unobtrusive - But adoption requires a lot more code changes, not only the "erasure" part but also the parts where the passwords are created 3. Module/Class function class, "helper function" + Unobtrusive - Adoption requires only the additional calls at the place where erasure is needed - Where to put this? 4. Separate class, not necessarily String-like + Unobtrusive - Adoption again requires lots of changes (like in 2.) - Will it be accepted by users? If I understand correctly your proposal would tend towards 4.? I'm open to anything, as long as there's something :) I haven't looked at the memory copy issue yet in detail, so I can't really tell for sure whether it's possible at all to control it entirely. Might as well be the case that we would need to document safe handling of passwords properly to ensure the desired outcome. I'd volunteer for that once we have found a stable solution. > But the most hard part I think is how we construct this Object... I know... :) > Martin, do you have concrete examples which needs secure erasure of > passwords? Only I can think of now is ossl_pem_passwd_cb in > ext/openssl. It gets password as a String from a callback block but it > would be good to add a feature to read from STDIN directly, without > creating the String object. Besides the cases within the OpenSSL extension that you mentioned, I was mainly thinking about authentication in web apps. You typically retrieve the password String from a request there. I need to dig deeper to come up with some concrete examples but I assume the idea should be clear. Besides that I kept thinking about what you said the other day, whether I'm only concerned about passwords or also about private keys and the like. I was only thinking passwords when I wrote this, but you're absolutely right, private keys in memory are equally bad [1]. It happens a lot that we use private keys in this way, SSH, SSL, digital signatures, encryption, you name it. And the biggest problem is that the private keys are not strings in general, so the String solution wouldn't apply directly. But I'm confident that we could at least apply the same technique. Fortunately, OpenSSL takes care of this for us in all places where we rely on OpenSSL (with its OPENSSL_cleanse function), but still we should investigate if there aren't any loopholes left. [1] http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.77.3297&rep=rep1&type=pdf ---------------------------------------- Feature #5741: Secure Erasure of Passwords https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/5741 Author: Martin Bosslet Status: Open Priority: Normal Assignee: Category: Target version: 2.0.0 In other languages it is considered good practice to securely erase passwords immediately after they were used. Imagine authentication in a web app - ultimately a String containing the password arrives at the server, where it will be processed and compared to some previously stored value. After this is done, there is no need to store these password Strings any longer, so they should be discarded right away (more on why later). In C, you would simply overwrite the array of bytes with zeroes or random values. In Java, Strings are immutable, that's why there it is common practice to use char[] for all things password and overwrite them when done. Currently, there is no way in Ruby to overwrite the memory that was used by a String. String#clear and String#replace both use str_discard internally, which only frees the underlying pointer without overwriting it. The problem with not erasing passwords is this: the contents of the String stay in memory until they are finally GC'ed. But even then only the pointer will be freed, leaving the contents mostly intact until the memory is reclaimed and overwritten later on. This could be exploited if an attacker had access to the memory of the server. This could happen in many ways: a core dump after a crash, access to the host if the server runs in a VM, or even by deep-freezing the DRAM :) [1] It could be argued that given the examples above, much more devastating attacks would be possible since in all of those cases you more or less have physical access to the machine. But I would still consider this to be a valid concern, if not only for the reason of never opening additional attack surfaces if they can be avoided relatively easily. I also found [2], which seems to show that Python deals with similar problems and it also contains more background info. Eric Hodel and I discussed this yesterday and Eric came up with a C extension that can be used to illustrate the problem (attached). If you inspect the resulting core dump, you will find the following: - the untouched String remains in memory fully intact - the String#clear'ed String remains to a large extent, typically the first character is missing - so if you typed "PASSWORD", search for "ASSWORD" (unintentional pun) instead - The String#clear_secure'ed will have been completely erased, no traces remain My questions: 1. Would you agree that we need this functionality? 2. Where would we ideally place it? I'm not sure whether String is the perfect place, but on the other hand, String is the only place where we have access to the implementation details. 3. Are there better alternative ways how we could achieve this? [1] http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/02/cold_boot_attac.html [2] http://stackoverflow.com/questions/728164/securely-erasing-password-in-memory-python -- http://redmine.ruby-lang.org